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THE DUTY TO TREAT ASYMPTOMATIC HIV-POSITIVE
PATIENTS OR FACE DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION
UNDER ABBOTT V. BRAGDON: THE SCYLLA AND
CHARYBDIS FACING TODAYS DENTAL AND HEALTH
CARE PROVIDERS
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself in the following scenario. You are an experi-
enced dentist with a small private practice, and you routinely
accept new patients and referrals. One of your long-time pa-
tients is scheduled for a routine tooth cleaning and dental ex-
amination. You make every effort to keep updated documenta-
tion on your patients, and in that pursuit, you request that the.
patient complete a basic written health questionnaire. In the
section relating to medications and relevant medical history, the
patient reveals that she is taking medications for Acquired
Immunodeficiency Syndrome ("AIDS"),' and that she has tested
positive for Human Immunodeficiency Virus ("HIV-positive").
1. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). Justice Kennedy de-
livered the opinion of the Court, during which he devoted a fair amount of introduc-
tory material to a thorough discussion of the physiological description of the progres-
sion of the AIDS virus:
The disease follows a predictable and, as of today, an unalterable
course. Once a person is infected with HIV, the virus invades different
cells in the blood and in body tissues. Certain white blood cells, known
as helper T-lymphocytes or CD4 cells, are particularly vulnerable to HIV.
The virus attaches to the CD4 receptor site of the target cell and fuses
its membrane to the cell's membrane. HIV is a retrovirus, which means
it uses an enzyme to convert its own genetic material into a form indis-
tinguishable from the genetic material of the target cell. The virus' genet-
ic material migrates to the cell's nucleus and becomes integrated with
the cell's chromosomes. Once integrated, the virus can use the cell's own
genetic machinery to replicate itself. Additional copies of the virus are
released into the body and infect other cells in turn.
The virus eventually kills the infected host cell. CD4 cells play a
critical role in coordinating the body's immune response system, and the
decline in their number causes corresponding deterioration of the body's
ability to fight infections from many sources.
Id. at 2203 (citations omitted).
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After reviewing the registration and health questionnaire
forms, you proceed with the appointment. Once the cleaning is
complete, you notice upon closer examination that she has a
cavity forming on a back tooth at her gum line that is in need
of a filling. You discuss this need for farther treatment with
her, but explain that your small office is not equipped with the
devices, equipment, and protective gear to adequately treat
patients with such infectious diseases. You agree to perform the
procedure at a local hospital, if she agrees to pay the additional
fees for usage of the hospital setting. She refuses. You are
unclear whether she objects to the additional fees, the reloca-
tion to the hospital setting, or your infectious disease treatment
policies.
Shortly after that initial visit, you learn that she has filed a
disability discrimination suit against you under the Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA) for failure to fill her cavity in
your office. You are called to defend your risk assessments,
medical judgment, patient treatment, and decision-making pro-
cess. You face a major litigation battle that must explore the
concepts of such integral, yet amorphous and somewhat ambig-
uous concepts as "disability"3 and "direct threat."4 You thought
your doctor-patient relationship was defined by contractual
principles, good faith, fair dealing, free enterprise, and minimal-
ly-regulated commerce.5 Now, you are confronted with a brick
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
3. See id. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C); see also discussion infra Part II.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(3); see also discussion infra Part II.
5. See generally Jill Cohen, Access to Medical Care for HIV-Infected Individuals
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: A Duty to Treat, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 233
(1992). Cohen explains that "an HCP [health care provider] has no duty to treat
anyone with whom it does not have a pre-existing contractual relationship." Id. at
235. She later declares that "[clontract theory governs the relationship between the
physician and patient .... Until both parties manifest either an express or implied
intent to create a contractual relationship, the physician has no duty to treat the pa-
tient." Id.
The American Bar Association commented on the constitutional defenses Dr.
Bragdon tried to make regarding his commercial, due process, and economic rights:
The ADA was not unconstitutional as applied to Bragdon. Title III of the
ADA appropriately regulates private dental practices, an economic activi-
ty, and is rationally related to a legitimate goal, and thus does not vio-
late the Commerce Clause. The ADA also does not violate Bragdon's due
process right to freedom from unjustified intrusions on his personal free-
dom because it does not require him to treat in his office anyone who
poses a direct threat, nor does it violate his limited right to freedom of
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wall intimating that you have a duty to treat all patients
across the board, regardless of your personal and professional
risk assessments concerning contagions, contamination, and
safety. What do you do?
Dr. Randon Bragdon, a dentist in Maine, confronted a nearly
identical situation in late 1995, when his former patient sued
him for refusing to perform treatment on her cavity in his den-
tal office because of her H1V-positive condition.6 Bragdon faced
having to defend his recommendation to his patient, Ms.
Abbott, that he treat her in a hospital setting, against her
allegations of illegal discriminatory behavior under the ADA.'
Bragdon encountered insurmountable statutory, regulatory,
precedential, legislative, judicial, and public policy obstacles as
he defended his case from the United States District Court for
the District of Maine8 to the First Circuit Court of Appeals,9
and ultimately to the United States Supreme Court;' ° yet, he
would not prevail."
Consequently, the current federal judicial climate remains
hospitable to the allegedly aggrieved HIV-positive patients who
sue health care and dental providers for what the patients
characterize as unlawfully terminated, delayed, unsatisfactory,
or incomplete treatment.' More than ever before, the provider
faces a duty to treat patients universally, regardless of disabili-
ty, with the narrow exception of those cases in which the risk
of harm to the provider, his staff, or other patients is so signifi-
contract.
American Bar Association, Case Law Development, 20 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY
L. REP. 196, 196 (1996).
6. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 88 (1st Cir. 1998).
7. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2201 (1998).
8. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
9. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997).
10. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
11. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998). On remand from the
United States Supreme Court, the court held, "we again find that Dr. Bragdon did
not submit evidence to the district court demonstrating a genuine issue of material
fact on the direct threat issue. Absent such a showing, the district court appropriately
entered summary judgment in favor of Ms. Abbott." Id. at 90.
12. See, eg., Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 23, 1996); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995); United States v.
Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872 F. Supp. 1381
(E.D. Pa. 1995); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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cant and extreme, that alternative treatment arrangements are
warranted. The pool of remedies afforded to these claimants
includes compensatory and punitive damages," injunctive re-
lief and equitable remedies,' 4 forced training and education of
providers and their staff,5 and required posting of a nondis-
criminatory policy of treatment," regardless of disability, in-
cluding HIV and AIDS. 7
The AIDS epidemic has undeniably shaken the American
workplace, and particularly, the health care industry, since its
first diagnosis in the United States nearly twenty years ago.'"
13. See generally Alix R. Rubin, HIV Positive, Employment Negative? H1V Dis-
crimination Among Health Care Workers in the United States and France, 17 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 398 (1996). Rubin compares the provisions and remedies of the Rehabilita-
tion Act to the ADA-
While the standards of discrimination appear to be almost identical under
the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA, the ADA is more expansive than
the Rehabilitation Act, and available remedies differ. Under the Rehabili-
tation Act, possible remedies include damages and the elimination of all
federal financial assistance to the medical center; remedies under the
ADA, on the other hand, include injunctive relief.., and back pay
(damages).
Id. at 424-25 (footnotes omitted).
14. See id.
15. See, e.g., Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1168 (ordering that defendants who re-
fused to provide treatment to persons with HIV or AIDS "undergo training concerning
HIV and the practice of dentistry").
16. See, e.g., Howe, 873 F. Supp. at 79-80. The court ordered that:
[Diefendants are to prominently post signs in their waiting rooms stating
that "[tihis health care provider is prohibited by law from discriminating
on the basis of HIV or AIDS. If you believe that this health care provid-
er has discriminated on the basis of AIDS or HIV, you may wish to
consult with an attorney."
Id.
17. See, e.g., Morvant, 898 F. Supp. at 1168. In Morvant, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana ordered that:
(1) Defendants be enjoined from refusing to provide treatment to persons
with HIV or AIDS, on the basis of their HIV positive status;
(2) Defendants be enjoined from having a blanket policy of "referring" out
all people with HIV or AIDS ...
(3) Defendants be required to adopt and post a policy of non-discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability, including B1V and AIDS;
(4) Defendants and their staff be required to undergo training concerning
HIV and the practice of dentistry.
Id.
18. See R. Bradley Prewitt, Comment, The "Direct Threat" Approach to the HIV-
Positive Health Care Employee Under the ADA, 62 MISS. L.J. 719, 719-23 (1993).
Prewitt characterizes the status of the AIDS epidemic as of 1993, with regard to
employment issues, as follows:
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As the medical community's increased awareness and knowl-
edge of the spread of the infection throughout the world has
increased, the clinical definitions used to describe the virus
have expanded. 9 The repercussions of AIDS, however, are just
now reaching the forefront of the legal community. Patients,
legislators, attorneys, and health care practitioners struggle to
make sense of the ambiguity surrounding the current legal
protection mechanisms for the disabled that concern HIV-posi-
tive patients throughout the various stages of AIDS, from
asymptomatic2' to highly symptomatic.22
The employment of llIV-positive individuals with AIDS has gener-
ated growing concern over occupational exposure and transmission. How-
ever, from a social policy perspective, fears of workplace transmission
typically have had little basis in fact; there have been no documented
cases of HIV infection through casual contact in the workplace.
In the health care industry, however, the threat of contact with
contaminated blood, fluids, and body tissues-all primary modes of virus
transfer-makes the fear of infection a legitimate concern. This concern is
due to not merely the presence of IV-positive employees, but also the
performance of invasive procedures by such employees.
Id. at 721-22 (footnotes omitted); see also Joel Neugarten, Note, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Magic Bullet or Band-Aid for Patients and Health Care Workers In-
fected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus?, 57 BROOm L. REv. 1277, 1277 (1992)
(stating that AIDS "has rapidly assumed epidemic proportions in many urban areas,
has confronted the medical profession with difficult ethical and legal dilemmas ....
The magnitude of the AIDS epidemic is reflected in an array of alarming statistics
and projections"); Rubin, supra note 13, at 398 (stating that "the first cases of ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) were reported on June 5, 1981").
19. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 398.
20. See generally Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998). The Court docu-
mented the stages of the HIV infection in a clinical manner.
The initial stage of HIV infection is known as acute or primary HIV
infection. In a typical case, this stage lasts three months. The virus con-
centrates in the blood. The assault on the immune system is immediate.
The victim suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the number of
white blood cells. There is no latency period. Mononucleosis-like symp-
toms often emerge between six days and six weeks after infection, at
times accompanied by fever, headache, enlargement of the lymph nodes
(lymphadenopathy), muscle pain (myalgia), rash, lethargy, gastrointestinal
disorders, and neurological disorders. Usually these symptoms abate with-
in 14 to 21 days. HIV antibodies appear in the bloodstream within 3
weeks; circulating HIV can be detected within 10 weeks.
Id. at 2203-04 (citations omitted).
21. See id. at 2204. The Court utilized the continuum of medical classifications
and nomenclature to depict the various stages of the virus, from contraction to incu-
bation, to manifestation of some symptoms, to fall-blown AIDS:
After the symptoms associated with the initial stage subside, the disease
enters what is referred to sometimes as its asymptomatic phase. The
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:665
At the most basic levels of legal analysis and interpretation,
we cannot escape the inevitable confrontation we must face
with public health epidemics such as the AIDS virus. The coop-
eration of lawyers, advocates, medical professionals, researchers,
and politicians is crucial in this ongoing pursuit to treat the
physiological aspects of the virus, and to safeguard the legal
rights of the individuals involved.
Part II of this article examines the relevant statutory author-
ity at issue in Abbott v. Bragdon,' and how that body of stat-
utory law first evolved from the Rehabilitation Act of 19734 to
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990.' The next section
surveys the current posture of the United States federal courts
on the application of the ADA to the potential plaintiff class of
HIV-positive patients.
Part III highlights the First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits and
their leadership in the judicial exploration into this unfamiliar
legal territory. The First Circuit's treatment of the landmark
term is a misnomer, in some respects, for clinical features persist
throughout, including lymphadenopathy, dermatological disorders, oral
lesions, and bacterial infections. Although it varies with each individual,
in most instances this stage lasts from 7 to 11 years. The virus now
tends to concentrate in the lymph nodes, though low levels of the virus
continue to appear in the blood. It was once thought the virus became
inactive during this period, but it is now known that the relative lack of
symptoms is attributable to the virus' migration from the circulatory
system into the lymph nodes.
Id. (citations omitted).
22. See id. The court described the benchmarks of the continuum of AIDS stages,
as the virus progresses on its terminal course:
A person is regarded as having AIDS when his or her CD4 count
drops below 200 cells/mm3 of blood or when CD4 cells comprise less than
14% of his or her total lymphocytes. During this stage, the clinical condi-
tions most often associated with HIV, such as pneumocystis carinii pneu-
monia, Kaposi's sarcoma, and non-Hodgkins lymphoma, tend to appear.
In addition, the general systemic disorders present during all stages of
the disease, such as fever, weight loss, fatigue, lesions, nausea, and diar-
rhea, tend to worsen. In most cases, once the patient's CD4 count drops
below 10 cells/ram3 [sic], death soon follows.
Id. (citations omitted).
23. 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995), affd, 107 F.3d 934 (1st Cir. 1997), cert.
granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997), vacated and remanded, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998),
affd on remand, 163 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 1998), and cert. denied 67 U.S.L.W. 3614 (U.S.
May 24, 1999).
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797b (1994).
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (1994).
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Abbott case has made noteworthy strides in establishing a legal
standard for discrimination by the medical community in its
treatment of HIV patients. This note traces the progression of
Abbott from its origins in Maine courts through the United
States Supreme Court in late 1998. Part IV discusses the
Court's majority opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, and the
Court's pro-plaintiff rationale and decision-making process
against the ADA's statutory backdrop.
Finally, Part V discusses the preliminary impacts and pre-
dicted future implications of the Abbott decision on both the
medical community and legal marketplace. The note concludes
with a summary of this landmark case, its statutory founda-
tions, public policy ramifications, and greater societal impacts.
II. RELEVANT STATUTORY AUTHORITY: THE AMERICANS WITH
DIsABILITIEs ACT AND THE REHABILITATION ACT
As the legislation in the area of disability discrimination
broadens in scope and purpose beyond conventional categories
and stereotypes, the litigation and uncertainty surrounding
whom it benefits, excludes, regulates, and impacts increases
exponentially.' This newness and unfamiliarity with the
unique nature and scope of AIDS within the context of the law,
rather than within medicine, is partially to blame for the confu-
sion and ambiguity that plague modern case law.
The succinct, plain language of statutes like the Americans
with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act lead interested
parties down one path of explicit interpretation, while the legis-
lative history surrounding related regulatory definitions and
26. See, e.g., School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987); Doe v. Dekalb County
Sch. Dist., 145 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1998); Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156
(4th Cir. 1997); Doe v. University of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir.
1995); United States v. Happy Time Day Care Ctr., 6 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (W.D. Wis.
1998); Hamlyn v. Rock Island County Metro. Mass Transit Dist., 986 F. Supp. 1126
(C.D. Ill. 1997); Cloutier v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 964 F. Supp. 299 (N.D. Cal.
1997); Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23,
1996); Anderson v. Gus Mayer Boston Store, 924 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Tex. 1996);
Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Hoepfl v. Barlow, 906 F. Supp.
317 (E.D. Va. 1995); United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157 (E.D. La. 1995);
Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994); Doe v. Kohn, Nast & Graf, P.C.,
862 F. Supp. 1310 (E.D. Pa. 1994).
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congressional floor debates 27 diverge down multiple paths of
implicit meaning and intent. The general rule prohibiting dis-
crimination on the basis of an individual's disability is rather
concise, but compact with dense definitions and phrases that
have become the subject matter of much litigation. In the fol-
lowing central provision, "[n]o individual shall be discriminated
against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoy-
ment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any
person,"' numerous clauses fall prey to ambiguity and disput-
ing interpretations.
For instance, "disability"' and "public accommodation"'
continue to baffle statute readers, as well as those charged with
interpretation. Some commentators choose to read the statute
narrowly and grant only limited protection to a limited subset
of the population.3' On the other hand, the majority of con-
gressional intent and judicial preferences today seem to opt for
a broader reading that will grant antidiscriminatory protection
to as broad a group of plaintiff applicants as is plausible and
reasonable in circumstances involving the proscribed activity.32
Therefore, the judiciary, legislature, medical community, and
27. See, e.g., Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Acting Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel, to Arthur B. Culvahouse, Jr., Counsel to the Pres-
ident (Sept. 27, 1988), reprinted in Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearings
on S. 933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor
and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 338-68 (1989).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a).
29. See id. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C).
30. See id. § 12,181(7).
31. See Michael D. Carlis & Scott A. McCabe, Comment, Are There No Per Se
Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? The Fate of Asymptomatic HIV
Disease, 57 MD. L. REv. 558, 581 (1998). The authors comment on the lingering un-
certainty in disability discrimination case law by remarking that, "[diespite this gen-
eral consensus among federal courts, the reasoning contained in most of the case law
is limited. No case provides a thorough analysis of whether asymptomatic HIV dis-
ease is a disability under the Act." Id.
32. Authors Carlis and McCabe remark on the emerging consensus of the federal
judiciary:
In the last decade, many federal courts have considered whether
asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability (or handicap) under either the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, or the ADA. These courts, with
the exception of the Fourth Circuit, have unanimously recognized that
asymptomatic HIV disease is covered as a disability.
Id. at 580-581 (footnote omitted).
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even the American public, still struggle to make sense of the
discrepancies and contradictions in the current law regarding
the status of AIDS as a disability.
The legislative history continues to baffle many observers
because the framework of support for an explicit inclusion of
HIV within the ADA seemed capable of withstanding the politi-
cal battles and controversies necessary to bring about the en-
largement of the class of disabled citizens. For instance, Repre-
sentative Dannemeyer conceded that, "with the adoption of this
act [ADA] we are instantaneously going to bring within the
definition of disabled person across this land every HIV carrier
in America."' Representative Waxman similarly championed a
broad inclusion of HIV patients within the ADA's protective
arms: "all such individuals [from asymptomatic HIV infection,
to symptomatic HIV infection] are covered under the first prong
of the definition of disability in the ADA."' Lastly, Senator
Armstrong emphasized the conclusive posture of the legislative
community behind the incorporation of AIDS into the ADA's
provisions when he remarked, "the legislative history of this bill
makes clear that infection with the AIDS virus-even in the
absence of any disabling symptoms-is a covered disability."'
Yet, Bragdon's attorneys explain that the committee reports
and congressional records seemingly contradict the ADA's con-
spicuous silence on the inclusion of AIDS as a result of "the
negotiated political price" that is integral to the political agenda
and related processes." Perhaps, the debaters conceded, AIDS
would not qualify as a "per se disability" under the ADA,3' but
that patients could still maneuver themselves into the position
of receiving statutory protection by establishing the requisite
levels of "impairment"3" constituting a disabled condition under
the statute.39 Other legislators may have earnestly believed




36. See id. at 25-26.
37. See id. at 24; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2) (1994). "Disability" is defined us-
ing three general conditions that can satisfy the status, rather than by listing specific
conditions that automatically and categorically apply on a "per se" level. See id. §
12,102(2)(A)-(C).
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C).
39. See Brief for the Petitioner at 27 n.20, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196
1999] 673
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that the virus was implicitly incorporated into the statute un-
der the general penumbra of closely-related conditions, infec-
tions, or terminal diseases. Regardless of the rationale and
intentions, uncertainty still lingers because of the glaring ab-
sence of plain language in the ADA's text.
At the heart of these disputes are the definitions of "disabili-
ty,"40 "impairment,"41 "major life activity,"42 "public accommo-
dation,""' "reasonable accommodation," 44  "undue hardship,""
and "direct threat"' under the ADA and its supplemental reg-
ulatory and statutory provisions. The crux of most litigation
centers around whether an asymptomatic HIV patient qualifies
as a member of the potential plaintiff class, who can sue for al-
leged discrimination that violates the protective guarantees of
the ADA.47 Most courts, legislators, and agencies agree that
the ADA should not be construed so narrowly as to permit
private business owners to refuse to serve customers or to grant
access to patrons in places of "public accommodation," based
solely on an individual's HIV-positive status." Yet, not all of
(1998) (No. 97-156) ("A finding of disability under the ADA will always require an
individualized inquiry into whether a plaintiff satisfies any of the three prongs of the
definition.").
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C).
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. § 12,181(7)(A)-(L). The "professional office of a health care provider,
hospital, or other service establishment" is explicitly listed in section 12181(7)(F) as a
private entity that is considered a public accommodation if its operations affect com-
merce. Id.
44. See id. § 12,111(9).
45. See id. § 12,111(10).
46. See id. § 12,111(3).
47. See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 580. ("[M]any federal courts have
considered whether asymptomatic HIV disease is a disability . . . under . . . the
ADA.-).
48. See Susan Moriarity Miltko, The Need for Professional Discretion: Health Pro-
fessionals Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1731 (1995).
Miltko writes of the ADA's incorporation of, meaning behind, and underlying policies
for the "public accommodation" provisions:
The ADA is also more extensive than previous civil rights statutes
in its definition of public accommodations. The Act defines places of pub-
lic accommodation as private entities that affect commerce and fall into
one of the twelve categories listed in the statute. While the status of a
physician's office as a place of public accommodation has been contested
under previous civil rights legislation, the ADA explicitly includes hospi-
tals and the professional offices of health care providers within its defini-
674
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the nation's courts are able to agree universally on classifying
the HIV disease as a per se disability;49 therefore, each new
case is examined individually, with regards to the symptoms of
the HIV disease, the activity level of the plaintiff, and the rela-
tive degree of the plaintiff's impairment.
The deciding factor continues to focus on the degree of symp-
toms the HIV-positive plaintiff manifests at the time of the
alleged discrimination on the basis of the patient's impaired
health.0 Understandably, the broad range of differing opinions
tion.
In general, the protections of the ADA are patterned after the
protections afforded individuals with disabilities under the Rehabilitation
Act. However, the ADA extends the protections found in the Rehabilita-
tion Act in two significant ways. First, the ADA applies to all employers
and places of public accommodation, not just those controlled or support-
ed by the federal government. Accordingly, all professional offices of
health care providers and hospitals are subject to the provisions of the
ADA. Second, the ADA's public accommodation provisions drop the "solely
by reason of her or his handicap" language found in Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act. Instead, the ADA prohibits any discrimination "on the
basis of disability." Thus, someone claiming discrimination under the
ADA need not prove that the sole basis of exclusion was the individual's
disability, as was necessary under the Rehabilitation Act. Rather, discrim-
ination that is even partially based on a person's disability is deemed
illegal under the ADA. Through its unprecedented specificity, scope, and
affirmative requirements, the ADA provides extensive new rights to mil-
lions of disabled Americans.
Id. at 1743-44. (footnotes omitted).
49. See generally Brief for the Petitioner at 26-27, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct.
2196 (1998) (No. 97-156). The Petitioner's Brief discussed the impracticality of elevat-
ing HIV to the status of a per se disability under the ADA.
What is clear concerning the decision whether HIV is a per se disability
is that a move from reliance on the statute to reliance on legislative
history is a move from what is arguably plain and in accord with com-
mon sense . . . to what is less plain and logically unsupportable (that all
asymptomatic persons with HIV are substantially limited in a major life
activity). The Court should therefore decline the invitation to elevate
parts of the legislative history which treat HIV as a disability per se to
the status of the statute.
Id.
50. In Abbott, Justice Kennedy discussed Bragdon's perceptions of how much a
patient's symptomatic condition impacts the treating provider's, or even the greater
public's, awareness of a potential disability, such as having AIDS:
[Bragdon] claims that Congress intended the ADA only to cover those
aspects of a person's life which have a public, economic, or daily charac-
ter. The argument founders on the statutory language. Nothing in the
definition suggests that activities without a public, economic, or daily
dimension may somehow be regarded as so unimportant or insignificant
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on even the most fundamental basics of the parties' health
conditions complicates litigation and provides numerous discov-
ery and evidentiary hurdles.5 Until recently, the affected par-
ties were left to turn to conflicting case law to attempt to dis-
as to fall outside the meaning of the word "major." The breadth of the
term confounds the attempt to limit its construction in this manner.
118 S. Ct. 2196, 2205 (1998) (citations omitted).
51. Compare Brief for the Respondent at 5, 13, Abbott (No. 97-156), with Brief for
the Petitioner at 3, Abbott (No. 97-156). Abbott maintains in the Respondents Brief:
There is no dispute here that HIV is a physical impairment. The statu-
tory term "physical impairment" refers to a physiological condition which
worsens or diminishes one's physiological state. Upon infection, HIV cre-
ates abnormalities and deficiencies in the blood and immune systems and
renders bodily fluids infectious and diminished in quality.
Brief for the Respondent at 5, Abbott (No. 97-156).
Later in the Respondent's Brief, clinical and medical aspects of HIV are pre-
sented:
Based on undisputed medical evidence in the record, HIV fits easily with-
in the plain meaning of "physical impairment." HIV infection is an incur-
able disease which, even before the onset of outward signs of illness,
diminishes bodily functions in two ways. First, HIV creates abnormalities
and deficiencies in the blood and immune systems. When HIV enters the
body, it multiplies and has an immediate and destructive effect on the
blood (hemic) and lymphatic systems, which are critical to the body's
defense against infection. Thus, even before the onset of overt symptoms,
HIV infection causes a progressive destruction of the body's blood, lym-
phatic and immune systems, diminishing the body's capacity to fight in-
fections. Second, the bodily fluids of an HIV-positive person, including
blood, semen, and breast milk, are infectious. In the most basic sense,
then, the bodily fluids of a person with HIV are abnormal, damaged, and
diminished in quality.
Id. at 13 (citations and footnotes omitted).
Justice Kennedy concedes that HIV has immediate impairing characteristics:
The initial stage of HIV infection is known as acute or primary infection.
In a typical case, this stage lasts three months. The virus concentrates in
the blood. The assault on the immune system is immediate. The victim
suffers from a sudden and serious decline in the number of white blood
cells. There is no latency period.
Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2203.
Bragdon, however, in the Petitioner's Brief, presents a contrasting view of
asymptomatic AIDS patients and their physical conditions:
Approximately five percent of individuals infected with HIV have "re-
mained clinically healthy and immunologically normal for more than a
decade." In fact, the "median interval between infection and the develop-
ment of AIDS has been 10 years." During this period, many asymptemat-
ic individuals with HIV remain clinically health and immunologically nor-
mal. As the word itself connotes, asymptomatic HIV infection does not
substantially limit a person's ability to care for one's self, perform manu-
al tasks, walk, see, hear, speak, breathe, learn, or work.
Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Abbott (No. 97-156) (citations omitted).
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cern the current direction of a judicial response and interpreta-
tion to a myriad of complex fact patterns.
III. CURRENT POSTURE OF FEDERAL COURTS ON APPLICABILITY
OF THE ADA TO HIV-PosrrivE PATIENTS
A. Key Judicial Players Set the Stage for Landmark
Adjudication: The First, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits Step
Forward and Respond
While the Fourth Circuit continues to adopt a position differ-
ent52 from the majority of the other circuits, such as the First
and Ninth Circuits,53 on the scope of the ADA's protections
extending to asymptomatic HIV-positive patients, the case law
is starting to align into a discernible pro-plaintiff progression.
Most federal jurisprudence supports the broadening interpreta-
tion of the ADA and its protections, regardless of where the
plaintiff's HIV status lies on the symptomatic continuum.'
The legislative history underlying the ADA rises to the fore-
front of judicial consideration as federal judges repeatedly re-
mind parties of the antidiscriminatory purposes of the statute,
namely to prohibit the foreclosure of "full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or ac-
commodations of any place of public accommodation" merely on
the basis of a disability.5
52. See, e.g., Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1997); Ennis v.
National Ass'n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, 53 F.3d 55 (4th Cir. 1995); Doe v. University
of Md. Med. Sys. Corp., 50 F.3d 1261 (4th Cir. 1995).
53. See generally Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 560 (explaining the
emerging consensus between the First and Ninth Circuits).
54. See id. at 559. The authors assert that "[t]he Fourth Circuit is the first feder-
al jurisdiction to interpret the [ADA's] protective scope so narrowly" as to hold "that
individuals with asymptomatic HIV disease are not disabled under the principal defi-
nition of 'disability' in the [ADA]." Id. at 558-59. According to these writers, the
"Fourth Circuit stands alone in its refusal to apply the Act's protection to individuals
with asymptomatic HIV disease." Id at 589.
55. 42 U.S.C. § 12,182(a) (1994). The statute provides:
No individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in
the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by
any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public
accommodation.
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The majority of courts56 hold that even asymptomatic HIV is
still considered a "disability" under the ADA, mainly because
these courts acknowledge the AIDS virus' "inescapable effect on
an individual's hemic or lymphatic systems."57 Many consider
the physiological occurrences within the blood stream, immune
system, and cells of the body to constitute the requisite level of
"physical ... impairment"" to satisfy the statutory definition
of "disability."59 The societal stigma and external physical ef-
fects of the virus' progression are unnecessary elements in sat-
isfying this statutory hurdle. Nor are these manifestations or
aspects of the disease required to arrive at the conclusion that
internal havoc continues to wage within the patient's cells, no
matter how seemingly inconspicuous.' Additionally, the infec-
tions, fever, skin conditions, weakness, pneumonia, dementia,
and diarrhea that later accompany the various stages of the
AIDS virus also manifest physical conditions that would further
constitute impairment.61
56. See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, passim. For example, the First Circuit,
the Ninth Circuit, a California federal district court, a Pennsylvania federal district
court, and a Texas federal district court have all held that asymptomatic HIV is
considered a disability. See id. at 580-89.
57. Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 589.
58. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C). The statute's first prong of the disability defini-
tion focuses on the most concrete and tangible manifestations of impairing symptoms:
"(A] physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual." Id. § 12,102(2)(A).
59. See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 589.
60. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998). The Court explained:
It was once thought the virus became inactive during this period, but it
is now known that the relative lack of symptoms is attributable to the
virus' migration from the circulatory system into the lymph nodes....
In light of the immediacy with which the virus begins to damage
the infected person's white blood cells and the severity of the disease, we
hold it is an impairment from the moment of infection. As noted earlier,
infection with HIV causes immediate abnormalities in a person's blood,
and the infected person's white cell count continues to drop throughout
the course of the disease, even when the attack is concentrated in the
lymph nodes.
Id.
61. See id. at 2203-04 (detailing the stages of the AIDS virus from the "acute or
primary infection," to the "asymptomatic phase," to later symptomatic phases, to its
final phases, concluding in death).
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Should this internal, microbiological physical destruction of
the immune system not satisfy the statutory hurdles, however,
the third component of the "disability" definition, incorporating
social stigma and lay opinion, will probably fill the gap. One
commentator remarked, "an enormous social stigma is attached
to the diagnosis of AIDS that encompasses both fear of conta-
gion and prejudice directed toward the victims' lifestyles." 2
Some commentators take a further leap in logic by declaring
that public stigma is similarly manifested in the community of
health care providers.' The National Commission on AIDS, a
presidential and congressional advisory board, observed as early
as 1990, that only 2,000 of the 600,000 practicing physicians in
the United States were willing to remain on the referral list for
the Physicians Association for AIDS Care.'
The second component of the definition for "disability" may
apply in situations in which a person carries the dormant HIV
virus in his body for long periods of time.' This component
takes into account the often lengthy incubation periods for
diseases like AIDS.66 Once the disease overtly manifests itself,
the progression is slow enough to allow for a lengthy medical
history or period of hospitalization. 7 This progression and de-
terioration process could be classified under the last type of dis-
ability classification due to the "record of such an impair-
ment."
Notwithstanding the Fourth Circuit's denial of a per se dis-
ability status for asymptomatic HIV-positive patients, the pro-
gression of Abbott v. Bragdon through the First Circuit has
62. Neugarten, supra note 18, at 1278-79.
63. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 5, at 234; Rubin, supra note 13, at 398;
Neugarten, supra note 18, at 1341; Prewitt, supra note 18, at 722-23.
64. See Neugarten, supra note 18, at 1279.
65. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2204 (1998).
66. See id. ("Although it varies with each individual, in most instances this stage
lasts from 7 to 11 years.").
67. See Brief for the Respondent, at 6, Abbott (No. 97-156). The respondent noted:
By setting an unexpected and premature end-point on life, a fatal dis-
ease, such as HIV, limits a wide array of major life activities (including
those activities which require thinking about the future) and inevitably
changes the experience of life itself. Individuals with HIV are also sub-
stantially limited because they require life-long and complex medical care.
Id.
68. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(B) (1994).
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accomplished a great deal in terms of settling the status of the
applicable case law. Even though Maine is not one of the areas
in the United States with the highest density of reported AIDS
cases,69 the jurisdiction proactively tackled the issue of an HIV
patient's disability status under antidiscrimination statutes
such as the ADA and its federal predecessor, the Rehabilitation
Act. Perhaps jurisdictions facing the complexities of the AIDS
epidemic on larger scales due to an increased population base,
such as New York, California, and Washington, D.C., will mir-
ror Maine's response to this pressing public health issue.
B. The First Circuit Steps to the Plate with Abbott v. Bragdon
1. Overview and Background Information
As of December 29, 1998, the uncertainty surrounding the
ADA's application to AIDS finally began to dissipate. For, on
the eve of a new year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, on remand from the United States Supreme
Court, again affirmed its previous decision in favor of an HIV-
positive dental patient alleging discriminatory treatment by her
former dentist." , Bragdon had unsuccessfully argued that the
court of appeals should embrace an individualized, more subjec-
tive medical assessment of the risks surrounding treatment of
HIV-positive patients. He had pressed both the court of appeals
and the Supreme Court to apply the treating doctor's assess-
ment rather than that of a distanced trier of fact using a rea-
sonable prudent person standard borrowed from tort law or the
opinion of a removed public health official." The Supreme
69. See generally Rubin, supra note 13, passim (contrasting the reported cases in
the United States with those of France, particularly the urban locations in the re-
spective countries, like New York, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and Paris).
70. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1998).
71. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 944 (1st Cir. 1997).
The second threshold determination involves the degree of deference due
the medical judgments of public health authorities. The government joins
Ms. Abbott in arguing for a rule which, if embraced, would cede great
deference to those authorities. They posit that, in the absence of dissent
among public health authorities, a service provider should be bound to
accept the expressed collective judgment of those authorities unless he
can demonstrate that this judgment is medically unreasonable. In con-
trast, Dr. Bragdon asseverates that, at least in the case of a service pro-
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Court and First Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Bragdon's
proposal. Both courts affirmed their former approaches allowing
an objective, third-party evaluation of the appropriateness of a
health care practitioner's discrete decision making in a given
scenario.72
As a result of this decision, the Maine courts have a solid
preference for allowing public health officials to make these
assessments instead of the medical professional who actually
faced the particular treatment decision. The bench is unwilling
to allow the person who faces the particular conflicting inter-
ests, medical risks, and safety assessments to make the legal
determinations surrounding treatment of disabled patients, for
fear that such a decision introduces subjectivity, personal preju-
dice, and social stigma into the medical treatment relationship.
The judicial preference for objective risk assessment of patient,
staff, and provider safety becomes even more evident with this
landmark case.
2. Factual Summary
Abbott v. Bragdon commenced in a Maine district court73
when the patient, Sidney Abbott, filed suit against her long-
time dentist, Dr. Randon Bragdon, for allegedly refusing to
treat her gum line cavity in his Bangor, Maine office after
learning of her HIV-positive condition. Abbott volunteered the
vider who is himself a skilled professional (such as a doctor or dentist), a
court should defer to the provider's judgment, as long as it appears to
have been reasonable in light of then-current medical knowledge.
Id.
72. See id. at 945.
The statute, the suggestion implicit in the regulations, and the teachings
of the Court are best synthesized by fashioning a rule which gives prima
facie force to the views of public health authorities, but which permits a
service provider to challenge those views based on contrary, properly
supported opinions voiced by other recognized experts in the field (e.g.,
research studies published in peer-reviewed journals). Such a rule accords
a meaningful degree of respect to the views of public health authorities,
particularly when those views are unanimous. But the rule draws a dis-
tinction between respect and absolute capitulation. Under it, the conclu-
sions of public health authorities may be rebutted by persuasive evidence
adduced from other recognized experts in a given field.
Id.
73. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580 (D. Me. 1995).
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information regarding her long-term asymptomatic HIV-positive
condition during the process of completing and discussing
health forms and registration materials at Bragdon's office.74 It
is significant to note that Abbott was not a gratuitous "walk-in"
patient as her visit was prescheduled through an appointment
for her routine dental treatment.75 Her cavity was also not
unusual in and of itself, but Bragdon felt her HIV condition
complicated the treatment because of the likelihood of blood,
saliva, or aerosol mists of these bodily fluids making contact
with the dentist and his dental staff.7"
Once his examination revealed the need for a cavity filling,
Bragdon discussed his infectious disease treatment policy with
Abbott.77 Bragdon suggested that he would prefer to treat her
in a hospital setting, where he would be better equipped to deal
with the precautions, equipment, and protectionary measures
necessitated by her infectious condition.78 He presented this
option to Abbott and explained that he would still be willing to
do the procedure and would not need to refer her to a specialist
but that he would expect her to assume the financial responsi-
bilities associated with any additional charges the hospital
would impose.7"
Abbott declined this option and sued Bragdon for discrimina-
tion under Title III of the ADA, as well as the Maine Human
Rights Act ("MHRA7).8 ° The court combined its analysis of the
two statutes because it noted that the state human rights stat-
ute merely served to complement the ADA."1 The majority of
the litigation surrounding this landmark case centered around
the relative applicability of the statutory interpretations and
underlying congressional intent regarding the asymptomatic
HIV status of patients like Abbott.
74. See id. at 584.
75. See id.
76. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 943.
77. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 584.
78. See id.
79. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 937-38.
80. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 583-84.




The district court granted summary judgment for Abbott."
The court held that Abbott had a "disability" as a matter of law
because her HIV condition, even though asymptomatic, is a
"Physical impairment" under the ADA." The court held that
her condition also substantially limited one of her major life ac-
tivities, namely, procreation, because of her shortened life ex-
pectancy and the risk of transmitting the virus to her potential
unborn child and/or the child's father.' Either of these two
limitations, qualified Abbott as a member of the potential class
of disabled plaintiffs under the ADA.
The court did not focus on whether Abbott manifested a de-
sire to procreate, whether she even considered marriage and
having a family, whether she was heterosexual, whether she
was fertile, or any other practical consideration surrounding
procreation decisions. In that respect, maybe the procreation
argument was too attenuated or creative in the court's opinion,
and in some ways merited a sua sponte consideration of poten-
tial alternative rationales. Yet, these alternative considerations
never received the judicial spotlight because the district court
found Abbott sufficiently established her prima facie case when
she proved that her asymptomatic HIV status had substantially
limited her major life activity of reproduction. The court ulti-
mately concluded that she was "disabled as a matter of law un-
der the ADA" because of her limited reproductive condition.'
The court concentrated its analysis on whether the average
reasonable person would consider the health effects of AIDS an
impairment to one's ability to reproduce. To many observers of
this case's development, the lymphatic and cell impairment
dwarfs the lifestyle arguments concerning one's ability to con-
ceive, carry, give birth to, and raise a child. These commenta-
82. See id. at 595.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A) (1994). The first prong of the disability definition
concerns either a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits a patient's
major life activities. See id.
84. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 586-87.
85. See id.
86. Id. at 587.
1999] 683
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
tors consider that type of disability broader and more generally
applicable to a larger section of the potential plaintiff class."
For instance, by making reproduction impairment the focal
point, one could argue that the floodgates are open, and conse-
quently, any infertile individual could come forward to join the
amorphous, overly-broad, and ever-expanding plaintiff class.
Again, the court adopted a pro-plaintiff stance in allowing a
plaintiff such as Sidney Abbott to effortlessly clear the hurdle
of establishing herself as "disabled" under the ADA.
The trial court denied Bragdon's claim that the ADA was
unconstitutional and disagreed with his claim that the ADA
unjustly inhibited his freedom to contract.8 His arguments for
the freedom to practice dental medicine on a local level, unin-
hibited by the federal government's regulatory interference
under the Commerce Clause,89 as well as his protests over his
curbed due process rights were both flatly denied.9" Because
Bragdon operated a private facility, and his dental services pre-
sumably had an impact on the local economy, his conduct was
regulated under the applicable public statutes. Bragdon, there-
fore, could not use private enterprise, due process concerns of
personal security and privacy, or his contractual arrangement
particular to Abbott to escape his potential liability exposure
under the ADA.9" Rather than arguing for a blanket statutory
loophole exception to its application on his patient's behalf,
Bragdon should have focused on the nuances in interpretation
and application of the ADA and its companion statutes.
87. See, e.g., Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 581. ("The cases generally con-
clude that HIV always impairs individuals' hemic systems ....").
88. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 594-95. The court stated:
Defendant asserts that the ADA also violates his fundamental right to
freedom of contract, also deriving from the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the Constitution, by forcing him to accept patients
against his will. .. . The Supreme Court, however, has dramatically
curtailed the due process right to freedom of contract which Defendant
seeks to invoke against the ADA. ... IT]he Court determines that due
process freedom of contract fails to provide grounds for declaring the
ADA unconstitutional.
Id.
89. See id. at 592-94.
90. See id. at 594-95.
91. See id. at 592-95.
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The district court found that the ADA was constitutional as
applied to Bragdon's practice because Title III of the ADA prop-
erly and explicitly regulates private practices such as Bragdon's
dental office.92 Because his practice is an economic activity in
the Bangor, Maine, marketplace, as well as a place of "public
accommodation," the state and federal regulations impacting his
practice must merely satisfy the "rational basis" scrutiny test93
for constitutionality. Namely, the ADA's regulation of Bragdon's
practice must be rationally related to some legitimate federal
policy goal, such as the protection against discrimination for
disabled patients." The district court, applying the rational
basis test, held that the ADA survived Bragdon's constitutional
challenge.95
Likewise, Bragdon's due process claims of inhibited contractu-
al and economic freedoms failed. The trial court found that the
ADA did not violate his due process right "to freedom from
unjustified intrusions on his personal freedom because it does
not require him to treat in his office anyone who poses a direct
threat, nor does it violate his limited right to freedom of con-
tract."" In the circuit court's opinion, Bragdon's claims simply
did not rise to the level of a valid due process constitutional
challenge. Instead, the court focused on what it considered
Bragdon's only potentially viable defense-the "direct threat" ar-
gument.9" Bragdon would have been wiser had he strategically
92. See id. at 592-94. At the appellate level, Judge Selya wrote, "on the facts of
record, the defendant's refusal to render routine dental care to an HIV-positive pa-
tient offends a duly enacted federal statute and thus cannot be tolerated by a court
of law." Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 949 (1st Cir. 1997).
93. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 594. The court explained that rational basis scru-
tiny will apply to federal statutes, such as the ADA that regulate private enterprise,
like Bragdon's dental practice:
Having determined that title III of the ADA appropriately regulates
Defendants dental practice, the Court must also determine whether title
III survives rational basis scrutiny, meaning that title III must be ratio-
nally related to a legitimate constitutional end, and that the means cho-
sen by Congress must be reasonably tailored to reach that end.
Id. (citations omitted).
94. See id.
95. See id. ("Defendant does not contest title III on rational basis grounds, and
the Court concurs in the judgment of the Morvant Court that title III meets this
minimal scrutiny.").
96. American Bar Association, supra note 5, at 196.
97. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 943. ("The term 'direct threat' is defined by the
[ADA]; in this context it contemplates the existence of 'a significant risk to the health
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concentrated his case around the overwhelming clinical details
surrounding the risks of spreading AIDS, the meticulous prac-
tical burdens of treating AIDS patients (or conversely, treating
patients as a provider with AIDS), and the mind-boggling rami-
fications one faces upon contracting the terminal virus.
The circuit court held, however, that this "direct threat" de-
fense is only appropriate when the plaintiffs treatment requires
an invasive procedure that would pose a significant risk to the
health and safety of others.9" Unfortunately for Bragdon, a
simple, noninvasive, and routine cavity procedure did not rise
to the degree of presenting the requisite "significant risk" the
ADA demands. District Judge Brody wrote the opinion for the
lower court, in which he explained the narrow application of
this "direct threat" exception relative to the general duty of a
health care provider to treat all patients, regardless of disabili-
ty: "The ADA does not require a covered entity to extend its
public accommodations to any individual who poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others."'
Judge Brody echoed the statutory definition of "direct threat"
under the ADA to emphasize that a risk only satisfies this
definition when policy, procedure, practice, and service modifica-
tions fail to eliminate that harm to public health and safe-
ty.10 ° A practitioner is expected to perform all adaptations and
revisions to his treatment and services as practical, without
incurring undue hardship up to the point at which no amount
of behavioral or practice modification is able to mitigate the
extreme level of risk. For example, the Centers for Disease
Control ("CDC")'0 ' and public health officials do not consider
it onerous to require a practitioner to wear protective masks,
or safety of others that cannot be eliminated by a modification of policies, practic-
es, or procedures or by the provision of auxiliary aids or services."').
98. See id.
99. Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 587.
100. See id.
101. See id. at 588 n.7 (explaining the function of the CDC and its role in provid-
ing guidelines for health care of HIV patients). See generally Brief for the Petitioner,
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998) (No. 97-156). The CDC establishes and re-
vises the clinical definitions for AIDS, and also recommends the precautionary mea-
sures that doctors and dentists are to utilize in their offices when treating H1V pa-
tients. These guidelines serve to eliminate infectious disease risks that out-patient
and in-office treatment may otherwise pose to medical providers or professionals,
staff, and other patients.
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wash his hands more frequently, use strong sterilizing agents
on utensils, wear double gloves if necessary, and purchase as
many disposable instruments as possible."2 These procedures
have documented results in decreasing the risks of spreading
contagious diseases like AIDS and are proven most effective in
this risk containment in comparison to their overall costs in
terms of time, money, and effort.' 3
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit af-
firmed the trial court's decision in favor of Abbott." It is
most significant to note, however, that the court of appeals only
granted certiorari on one limited issue. It pinpointed the ques-
tion of whether the assessment of risks involved in treating an
HIV-positive patient can be made from the standpoint of the
health care practitioner involved in the treatment of the plain-
tiff-patient or whether public health officials, objective third-
party medical experts, or some sort of expert panel must make
the risk determination involved in the treatment decision.' 5
When the court of appeals affirmed the lower court's decision,
Bragdon appealed again,0 6 alleging that the plaintiff's experts
were erroneously permitted to utilize medical information and
knowledge that were not available at the time he made his
initial assessment of the treatment risks. Bragdon asserted that
this utilization of more recent evidentiary information unfairly
advantaged the plaintiffs claim."'
102. See Abbott, 912 F. Supp. at 588 n.7.
103. See id.
104. See Abbott, 107 F.3d at 949 (affirming the district court's holding that granted
Abbott's motion for summary judgment).
105. See id. at 944-45 (describing the appropriate balance between giving deference
to the authority of public health officials and making independent assessments as a
skilled professional when there is no consensus, evidence of unreasonableness, or
dissent among qualified officials).
106. See id. at 949, cert. granted in part, 118 S. Ct. 554 (1997).
107. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2211-13 (1998).
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IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CHAMPIONS
ABBOTTS CAUSE OF PATIENTS' RIGHTS TO MEDICAL AND
DENTAL TREATMENT
A. The United States Supreme Court's Majority Opinion'
The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding that
Abbott's HIV infection qualified as an ADA disability and vacat-
ed and remanded the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit's
grant of summary judgment in favor of Abbott."9 The Court
remanded the case so that Bragdon would be given an opportu-
nity to combat the information and expert testimony Abbott
raised against him.110 Bragdon claimed the significant risk of
infection warranted a transferral of the patient to an alterna-
tive location for treatment, where he alleged that the equip-
ment, gear, and precautionary measures could more easily,
readily, and efficiently be utilized in the treatment of a patient
with infectious diseases, such as Abbott."'
It is important to note that the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded only part of the lower court's decision, thereby send-
ing the case back to the First Circuit Court of Appeals for lim-
ited evidentiary review, rather than reversing the entire deci-
sion in Bragdon's favor."' Understandably, the Supreme Court
and the nation's lower courts tread lightly through such murky
waters of public health epidemics and their potential applica-
108. See id. at 2200. Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion for the majority of the
Court, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. Justice
Stevens filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Breyer joined. Justice Ginsburg
filed a concurring opinion. Chief Justice Rehnquist filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined Chief
Justice Rehnquist's opinion. Justice O'Connor joined Part II of Chief Justice
Rehnquist's opinion and filed her own opinion concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part. (Kennedy's opinion is a majority because he was joined by the
minimal number of justices, four, to constitute a simple majority.) See id.
109. See id. at 2213.
110. See id. (concluding that the "proper course is to give the Court of Appeals the
opportunity to determine whether our analysis of some of the studies cited by the
parties would change its conclusion that petitioner presented neither objective evi-
dence nor a triable issue of fact on the question of risk").
111. See Brief for the Petitioner at 7, 8, 43, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196
(1998) (No. 97-156).
112. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2213.
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tion to federal statutory protection mechanisms. This does not
appear to be either an area of radical policymaking or radical
adjudication. The court of appeals consequently ordered supple-
mental briefing on the limited issue remaining: "whether perfor-
mance of the cavity-filling procedure posed a 'direct threat' to
others and thereby came within an exception to the ADA's
broad prohibition against discrimination.""' After the parties
submitted their new briefs on this issue, the court entertained
more oral argument before ultimately reaffirming the district
court's summary judgment order."' Therefore, the First Cir-
cuit was able to solidify its position of a broad reading of the
protections afforded to "disabled" parties under the ADA. The
court failed to place significant emphasis on the statistical bat-
tles and medical expert testimonials the parties prioritized.
Rather, they focused on the rights of HIV patients to obtain
medical and dental treatment. Justice Kennedy believed that a
remand would allow the court of appeals to more fully explore
the plethora of clinical evidence, statistics, and guidelines." 5
The social stigma and political controversy surrounding this
litigation undeniably weighed heavily in each litigant's presen-
tation of viable resolutions, as well as the Court's ultimate
consideration of those alternatives.
B. Step-By-Step Analysis Through Statutory Provisions and the
Supreme Court's Decision Making in the Majority's Opinion
1. The First Tier in the Majority's ADA Interpretation
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, neatly outlined the
statutory analysis for an HIV-positive patient's discrimination
claim against her treating health care provider under the ADA.
First, the Court focused its review on the definition of "disabili-
ty 116 under section 12,102(2) of the ADA."' The Court held
that Abbott's HIV infection qualified as a "disability" under the
definition of "physical or mental impairment," which is de-
113. Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d. 87, 88 (1st Cir. 1998).
114. See id. at 90.
115. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2200.
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A)-(C) (1994).
117. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2201-07.
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scribed as a condition that "substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities""8 of the petitioning individual."
2. The Second Tier in the Majority's ADA Interpretation
The second tier of the Court's statutory interpretation cen-
tered around three steps. First, the Court examined whether
Abbott's HIV status was a "physical impairment." 20 Skep-
tics12' remark that the very nature of an asymptomatic stage
of any disease, even if terminal, dictates that this first require-
ment cannot be met.12 2 It is almost as if the proponents of
this specious argument believe that asymptomatic status and
physical manifestations or evidence of impairment to casual ob-
servers of the outside world are irreconcilable. Second, Justice
Kennedy directed his focus to the identification of the "major
life activity" that Abbott relied upon to argue she qualified as a
member of an ADA plaintiff class." Abbott used "reproduc-
tion and child bearing" as the requisite "major life activities"
that she alleged were impaired by her HIV condition.'
Abbott argued that all aspects of having children-from concep-
tion to parenting-were hampered in some way by her condi-
tion. Yet, her age, fertility, sexual orientation, and health were
never factored into this reproduction analysis." The Court re-
118. 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2)(A).
119. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2207.
120. See id. at 2202.
121. See Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Abbott (No. 97-156) (stating that "[als the
word itself connotes, asymptomatic HIV infection does not substantially limit a
person's ability to care for one's self, perform manual tasks, walk, see, hear, speak,
breathe, learn, or work"); Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 596-97 (describing the
Fourth Circuit judges' unwillingness to deem asymptomatic HIV patients as disabled
under the ADA: "Judge Williams explained . . .that asymptomatic HIV disease is not
a disability .... The judges dismissed outright any argument that asymptomatic
HIV disease constitutes a per se disability and suggested that an individual ... with
asymptomatic HIV disease could not 'credibly' argue that he was disabled under
the ... individualized-inquiry rule").
122. See Brief for the Petitioner at 3, Abbott, (No. 97-156) (explaining that an
asymptomatic HIV patient is unable to clear the first prong of the ADA's disability
definition because he cannot prove substantial impairment to a major life activity
when he suffers no overt physical manifestations of the disease and no substantial
lifestyle or routine curtailment).
123. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
124. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2202, 2204-05.
125. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 941-42 (1st Cir. 1997).
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sponded to the litigants' positions by marrying the two consid-
erations of impairment and major activities and asking whether
the impairment substantially limited Abbott's reproduction and
procreation life activities. 6
3. The United States Supreme Court's Study of Administrative
and Regulatory Authority
The Court conceded that the available case law was not dis-
positive on many of these specific statutory issues; therefore,
the Court looked to "interpretations of parallel definitions" in
previous statutes and the views of various administrative agen-
cies which have faced [these] ... interpretative question[s]."'27
For instance, one of the first statutes the Court referred to in
this analysis was the Rehabilitation Act: "The ADA's definition
of disability is drawn almost verbatim from the definition of
'handicapped individual' included in the Rehabilitation Act of
1973, [section] 706(8)(B)."' The Court was convinced of
Congress's intent to explicitly and heavily borrow language from
earlier statutes and then to incorporate that text into the ADA.
The relevant "borrowed" excerpt of the ADA reads, "[e]xcept as
otherwise provided in this chapter, nothing in this chapter shall
be construed to apply a lesser standard than the standards
applied under title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. " '29
The first step in the subsection (A) analysis was to determine
whether Abbott's HIV status constituted a "physical impair-
ment." In order to perform this analysis, the Court deferred to
the regulatory authority of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare ("HEW"), and its first regulations in 1977
interpreting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.3' The HEW regu-
lations defined the phrase "physical or mental impairment" to
encompass the following two components:
126. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2204-05.
127. Id. at 2202.
128. Id.
129. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12,201(a) (1994)). Justice Kennedy further explained
that the similarity of language between the two statutes required the Court "to con-
strue the ADA to grant at least as much protection as provided by the regulations
implementing the Rehabilitation Act." Id.
130. See id.
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(A) [Any physiological disorder or condition, cosmetic disfig-
urement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the
following body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; spe-
cial sense organs; respiratory, including speech organs;
cardiovascular; reproductive; digestive; genito-urinary; hemic
and lymphatic; skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or
psychological disorder, such as mental retardation, organic
brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific
learning disabilities.13'
The dispute really focused not on the previous definitions,
but rather on the list of examples that accompanied the regula-
tions. When HEW first issued the regulations, it decided not to
include an explicit and comprehensive listing of specific disor-
ders that would qualify as "physical or mental impairment[s],"
opting instead to give just a framework of examples. The HEW
clearly feared that a specific list would prove too narrow, as
medicine and technology continue to make rapid advances in
this field of public health and epidemiological research.'32
Despite these intentions, the comments included with the
regulations contained the following list of the representative
population of disorders, conditions, and diseases that would
meet the definition of "physical impairment": orthopedic diseas-
es; visual, speech, and hearing impairments; cerebral palsy; epi-
lepsy; muscular dystrophy; multiple sclerosis; cancer; heart
disease; diabetes; mental retardation; emotional illnesses; and
substance problems, such as drug and alcohol addiction.'33 No-
tice that AIDS and HIV are conspicuously absent from this
listing. Today, the Justice Department bears the responsibility
for these regulations, even though the HEW definitions remain
in force.' These regulations, along with the representative
condition and disease listing, remain intact.'
Not surprisingly, the Court's analysis continues to progress to
deeper levels, given that neither HIV infection nor AIDS is ex-
plicitly mentioned in the listing incorporated in these regula-
131. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(i) (1998).
132. See Abbott, 118 S. Ct. at 2202 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 22,685 (1977), reprinted in
45 C.F.R. pt. 84, app. A, at 334 (1997)).
133. See id.
134. See id. at 2203.
135. See id. (citing 28 C.F.R. § 41.31(b)(1) (1997)).
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tions. Justice Kennedy, however, wrote that the "HIV infection
does fall well within the general definition set forth by the
regulations."136 To Kennedy, the fact that the virus begins to
wreak havoc immediately on the patient's white blood cells, as
well as the overall severe consequences of the disease, which
almost certainly ends in death, lends support to the holding
that HIV is "an impairment from the moment of infection.""7
Kennedy emphasized the immediate, drastic, and detrimental
effects of the virus on the infected person's physiological health,
such as the hemic and lymphatic systems.38 In an effort to
foreclose any doubt of HIV's satisfaction of the statutory crite-
ria, Kennedy wrote, in summary, "[the] HIV infection satisfies
the statutory and regulatory definition of a physical impairment
during every stage of the disease."'39
4. The Third Tier in the Majority's ADA Interpretation
The third tier complicated the analysis further by incorporat-
ing "major life activity" into the impairment discussion; for, it is
not until the impairment impacts such an activity that the
"disability" definition is satisfied.40 The Court focused on re-
production as the only subset of "major life activity" because
Abbott identified procreation as the area of her allegedly per-
ceived impairment. Perhaps an alternate "major life activity'"
would have merited the Court's attention and persuaded the
justices to decide differently, had the litigants presented other
such arguments.
The Court then examined the issue of whether reproduction
qualified as "a major life activity" when it granted certiora-
ri." Justice Kennedy quickly dismissed any notions of inter-
pretative complexity or ambiguity with his succinct conclusion
that "[r]eproduction falls well within the phrase 'major life
activity,'" as "[r]eproduction and the sexual dynamics surround-
136. Id.
137. Id. at 2204.
138. See id.
139. Id.
140. See id. at 2205.
141. See id. at 2205-06.
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ing it are central to the life process itself." The "Rehabilita-
tion Act regulations support the inclusion of reproduction as a
major life activity, since reproduction could not be regarded as
any less important than working and learning."" Kennedy
was also quick to point to signaling terms like "such as," before
the regulation's listing to disclaim any notion of coverage
exhaustion."
5. The Fourth Tier of the Majority's ADA Interpretation
The fourth tier of the ADA's "disability" definition analysis
involved whether Abbott's particular "physical impairment" was
a substantial limitation on the particular "major life activity"
she identified-reproduction. " The Court held that Abbott's
infection restricted her ability to have children in two ways.
First, Justice Kennedy mentioned the significant risks that an
HIV-positive woman takes, carries, and potentially imposes on
her male partner when she tries to conceive. He highlighted a
statistic that predicted a "[twenty-five percent] risk of female-to-
male transmission" according to the cumulative results of more
than a dozen national studies. 46 Second, Justice Kennedy dis-
cussed the possibility of perinatal transmission of HIV, which is
the risk that a woman faces of infecting her newborn child with
the disease during either the gestation period or childbirth
process. Kennedy cited statistical support in published studies
that confirmed the accuracy of a twenty-five percent risk of
transmission of the virus from mother to child during the birth
process." 7
Throughout the substantial limitation discussion, Justice
Kennedy was careful to point out that the ADA addresses limi-
142. Id. at 2205.
143. Id. (citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (1997)). "[Flunctions such as caring for
one's self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing,
learning, and working" are included in the representative listing. Id.
144. See id.
145. See id. at 2204-09.
146. Id. at 2206 (citation omitted).
147. See id. (citation omitted). Kennedy mentions that most studies fall "within the
25% to 30% range," out of a total of 13 studies that placed the risk between 14% at
a minimum, and 40% at a maximum. Id. (citation omitted).
694
ASYMPTOMATIC HIV-POSITIVE
tations, but "not utter inabilities.""' The Court's holding and
rationale focused on the overall public health dangers as well
as the economic and legal consequences that an HIV-positive
woman must face if she decides to become a mother, rather
than emphasizing the slight possibility that conception and
childbirth are still possible for HIV patients through the use of
antiretroviral therapy. '49 Foremost, Kennedy was quick to dis-
tinguish that the "disability" definition "does not turn on per-
sonal choice."150 Rather, a plaintiff meets the significant limi-
tation statutory hurdle upon proving that formidable difficulties
exist but not by proving that the difficulties are insurmount-
able. 5
1
Justice Kennedy also discussed the deference the Court must
give to the truth of Abbott's testimony in the context of review-ing the appropriateness of granting summary judgment, re-
marking that "testimony from the respondent that her HIV
infection controlled her decision not to have a child is unchal-
lenged."'52 Kennedy clarified the developing precedent from
the lower district court and court of appeals, concluding that,
"no triable issue of fact impedes a ruling on the question of
statutory coverage" of the ADA to Abbott's circumstances.'53
The Supreme Court ultimately held that Abbott's HIV infection
fell within the statutory parameters of a "physical impairment"
because it "substantially limit[ed] a major life activity, as the
ADA defines it.""
The Court then turned to the discussion of the inclusion of
asymptomatic HIV patients within the penumbra of these ADA
statutory "major life activity" protections. Kennedy highlighted
numerous regulatory agency decisions, opinions, and orders, as
well as applicable case law from lower courts to support the
148. Id.
149. See id. Justice Kennedy discussed Bragdon's assertion that therapies such as
antiretroviral therapy or drugs can lower the risk of transmission of AIDS from
mother to child through the birth process. He cited statistics that equate the risk to
as low as eight percent and implied that this relatively low figure cannot qualify as a




153. Id. at 2207.
154. Id.
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notion that asymptomatic HIV patients are covered under the
ADA.'55 For example, the Office of Legal Counsel of the De-
partment of Justice ("OLC") 56 issued a "comprehensive and
significant" opinion in 1988 that concluded that the Rehabilita-
tion Act protected "symptomatic and asymptomatic HIV-infected
individuals against discrimination," years before the ADA was
even signed into law by President Bush in 1990."7 The OLC
determined that HIV, even in its asymptomatic phases was a
"physical impairment" under the Rehabilitation Act because it
was a physiological disorder of the hemic and lymphatic sys-
tems.'58 The OLC further proclaimed that HIV positivity sub-
stantially impacts the reproductive activity of even asymptomat-
ic patients: "HIV-infected individuals cannot, whether they are
male or female, engage in the act of procreation with the nor-
mal expectation of bringing forth a healthy child."'59 Kennedy
also referenced Surgeon General C. Everett Koop's letter that
characterized HIV patients as "clearly impaired," even during
asymptomatic phases of the disease.
6 °
Similarly, agencies have continued to adhere to the conclu-
sion that asymptomatic phases of the virus are also incorporat-
ed into the definitions within the ADA. The Comptroller
General's Task Force on AIDS in the Workplace, the Presiden-
tial Commission on the Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epi-
demic, and the Department of Health and Human Services
have all considered asymptomatic phases deserving of the same
statutory protections as the final, most visible stages of the
viruS.161
155. See id. at 2207-12.
156. See id. at 2207 (supplying the background information on the Office of Legal
Counsel of the Department of Justice ("OLC"), namely that the OLC makes official
determinations and publishes its opinions in the form of regulatory guidelines). The
OLC views asymptomatic AIDS patients as disabled citizens, deserving of ADA statu-
tory protection because at that stage, hemic and lymphatic systems are physically
impaired, pregnancy is endangered, and sexual relations are threatened or limited
due to contagion risks. See id.
157. Id. at 2207-08.
158. See id. at 2207.
159. Id. (citation omitted).
160. See id.
161. See id. (citing 5 C.F.R. § 1636.103 (1997); 7 C.F.R. § 15e.103 (1998); 22 C.F.R.




C. Majority Opinion Critique: Case-Specific Details that Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas Believe
Undermine Abbott's Prima Facie Case
Chief Justice Rehnquist believes that Justice Kennedy only
tackled "half of the relevant question" when he considered
whether Abbott's reproductive activity constituted a "major life
activity" under the ADA."2 Rehnquist was far more concerned
with curtailing Abbott's arguments for a more liberal reading of
the ADA and method of statutory interpretation, than he was
with analyzing the risk assessments and "direct threat" argu-
ments that Bragdon made. Chief Justice Rehnquist character-
ized Kennedy's analysis as a "truncat[ion of] the question" be-
cause he did not find "a shred of record evidence indicating
that, prior to becoming infected with HIV, [Abbott's] major life
activities included reproduction."1" In his opinion, the Court
too readily conceded that the petitioner satisfied her burden of
proving each element of her prima facie case. The Chief Justice
was unwilling to bend in his steadfast position that a sweeping,
global incorporation of asymptomatic HIV-positive patients
contravened the statute's underlying purpose.
Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued, in the alterna-
tive, that reproduction was not a "major life activity" in the
first place.' The Chief Justice stood firmly behind his
reading of the trial record that the only indication the Court
was provided of Abbott's HIV status affecting her reproductive
decisions was the evidence that, "after learning of her HIV
status, [Abbott], whatever her previous inclination, conclusively
decided that she would not have children.""s To Rehnquist,
the respondent presented "absolutely no evidence that, absent
162. Id. at 2214 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part) (arguing that the majority shortcut the requisite analysis with its trun-
cated test for determining ADA statutory application and protection).
163. Id. at 2214-15 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part).
164. See id. at 2215 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (disagreeing with the classification of reproduction as an activity and
disapproving of the Court's casual dismissal of Abbott's lacking evidentiary presenta-
tion on her particular lifestyle choices and timetables for reproduction).
165. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
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the HIV, [she] ... would have had or was even considering
having children."'66 He was not willing to entertain alterna-
tive speculation or future predictions of Abbott's lifestyle and
parenting decisions.
The Chief Justice deemed Abbott's argument that a "major
life activity" determination should not involve the particular
circumstances of each litigant's case as "inartful" and plagued
with careless diction. 67 That analysis, to Rehnquist, was mis-
classified, as he considered reproduction to be a "process," rath-
er than an "activity.""6 Finally, Chief Justice Rehnquist prof-
fered that, even if he conceded reproduction was a "major life
activity," he still failed to see the validity of Abbott's argument
that her HIV condition "substantially limited" her ability to
reproduce.'69 Rehnquist literally and narrowly interpreted the
definitional sections of the ADA, and construed the verb tense
and plain wording of the statute as absolutely critical to the
Court's analysis. He, therefore, dismissed Abbott's arguments of
future impaired delivery and parenting abilities, and pointed
out that she did not establish any present hurdles to her repro-
ductive capabilities. 7 '
V. PRELIMINARY IMPACTS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE
ABBOTT DECISION
A. Strong Precedential Value of the Case
Despite the underlying disparities and disagreements on the
various levels of our nation's benches, the precedential value of
this landmark case remains strong, as a growing consensus
166. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
167. See id. at 2215 n.2 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (focusing on the semantics of the majority's classification of repro-
duction and major life activities for HIV patients).
168. See id. (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
169. See id. at 2216 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dis-
senting in part) (arguing that Abbott failed to prove that she would be unable to
engage in sexual intercourse, become pregnant, carry the child to term, deliver the
child, and then care for the child in a normal, competent capacity).




continues to build behind incorporating asymptomatic AIDS
patients under the ADA. Justice Kennedy wrote that "[e]very
court which addressed the issue before the ADA was enacted in
July 1990 ... concluded that asymptomatic HIV infection satis-
fied the Rehabilitation Act's definition of handicap." 7' He lat-
er enumerated a long list of cases in support of this proposition,
from jurisdictions including Florida, California, and New
York.'72 Perhaps the fact that AIDS had been around for
nearly two decades, 7 ' combined with the available conflicting
and ambiguous body of case law, was sufficient to convince the
Court to step forward and offer overdue statutory interpretation
and adjudication.
Clearly, the Supreme Court recognized the landmark
precedential value that Abbott's case would have on this gener-
ation, as well as on those of the future, in terms of redefining
social, moral, political, and even economic policy, if necessary,
to provide proper accommodations for disabled citizens. The
repeated remands of the case to lower courts to exhaust eviden-
tiary procedures and to grant numerous opportunities to hear
subsequent oral argument, evidence the thoroughness with
which the nation's courts approached this issue. No justice or
judge was prepared to expeditiously dismiss the case's treat-
ment without first fully utilizing the judicial and administrative
resources at hand.
171. Id. at 2208 (concurring with the regulatory and agency authority at hand that
asymptomatic HIV patients qualify as handicapped under the Rehabilitation Act, and
then later, as disabled under the ADA).
172. See id. (citing Doe v. Garret, 903 F.2d 1455, 1457 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 499 U.S. 904 (1991); Ray v. School Dist., 666 F. Supp. 1524, 1536 (M.D. Fla.
1987); Thomas v. Atascadero Unified Sch. Dist., 662 F. Supp. 376, 381 (C.D. Cal.
1986); District 27 Community Sch. Bd. v. Board of Ed., 502 N.Y.S.2d 325, 335-37
(Sup. Ct. 1986)).
173. See Rubin, supra note 13, at 398. Rubin states:
Since the first cases of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)
were reported on June 5, 1981, the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV),
which is believed to cause AIDS, has had a profound impact both on the
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B. Anticipated Medical Community Reactions
As a result of decisions like Abbott v. Bragdon, doctors and
dentists alike will argue that they feel pressured to treat pa-
tients with contagious, infectious diseases, even at significant
risk to themselves, their staffs, and other patients. 4 These
providers will argue they would rather battle the dangerous
microbiological hurdles and physiological threats, rather than
risk exposure to the liability of a discrimination lawsuit because
they allegedly treated a patient differently on the basis of the
patient's disabled condition.' 5 Therefore, as the liability base
increases for doctors and dentists, there will probably be an
increased push to study and research precautionary and safety
measures, as well as to lower the costs of implementing those
procedures associated with regulatory compliance.
Otherwise, many health care providers may face discrimina-
tion litigation if they do not adapt their facilities, services, and
staff training policies and procedures to accommodate the in-
creased demands and complexities of treating patients with
infectious diseases. Ignorance and outdated technology, facili-
ties, and training will no longer serve as adequate excuses for a
doctor who chooses not to treat HIV-positive patients. Bragdon's
costly litigation experience poignantly forewarns practitioners
who choose to use a pretextual defense for failing to treat infec-
tious patients. The federal courts are equating this case's factu-
al scenario to an exercise of discrimination, rather than to a
business, contractual, or professional judgment in a medical
treatment context.
The doctor's freedom to contract and even his due process
rights are potentially inhibited by legal mandates that he must
treat HIV-positive patients just like all other patients, unless
he can prove to the trier of fact that there was a significant
174. See Brief for Petitioner, at 43-45, Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998)
(No. 97-156).
175. For cases involving doctors and health care providers potentially facing large
liability exposure for alleged delays, pretextual referrals to specialists or other facili-
ties, or refusals to treat HIV-positive patients, see Abbott v. Bragdon, 163 F.3d 87
(1st Cir. 1998); Doe v. Montgomery Hosp., No. 95-3168, 1996 WL 745524 (E.D. Pa.
1996); Sharrow v. Bailey, 910 F. Supp. 187 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Woolfolk v. Duncan, 872
F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1994).
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risk that warranted a referral to a specialist.76 In the
alternative, only in the most severe cases would a complete
refusal to treat patients with such compromised immune sys-
tems possibly suffice as an acceptable proof offering in this risk
assessment.'77 Doctors face the uncertainties of malpractice
insurance premium increases, personal liability, and related
liability concerns that may arise out of agency, respondeat su-
perior, or vicarious liability principles because of the decisions
they make during the scope of their employment or private
practice. Almost certainly, the "face" of medicine is changing
from a contractual arrangement to more of a broadened level of
professional service, in which the provider may indeed confront
something similar to the common law duty to treat.
C. Predicted Legal Response
As the public's initial panic dissipates and media attention
wanes with the increased prevalence of AIDS, legislators are
apt to react rationally to policymaking in this difficult arena of
a global public health pandemic. Perhaps, the legislative re-
sponse will even rise to the level of proactivity. Conspicuous
judicial cue cards might encourage broadened political and
legislative interpretations of these initial statutory protections.
If, however, the ambiguity in the ADA and its definitions con-
tinues to prove problematic, 78 it is likely the legislative re-
sponse will answer the call for more explicit enumeration, ex-
planation, and detail. Whether that response comes in the form
of a listing or recognition of current regulatory authority re-
mains to be seen. It would not be surprising though, to see
some sort of amendment to the Americans with Disabilities Act
of 1990 emerge. In particular, one potential amendment could
explicitly include asymptomatic HIV-positive patients within the
176. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 12,113(a)-(b) (1994) (explaining that providers can
use the protection of the health and safety of others as a valid defense in appropriate
circumstances, when required to confront a disability discrimination allegation).
177. See Abbott v. Bragdon, 912 F. Supp. 580, 588-89 nn.10-11 (D. Me. 1995). ("In
this case, however, neither the duration nor severity [of the transmission risk] out-
weigh the evidence as to how the disease is transmitted and the slight probability of
transmission.").
178. See supra Part II of this note for a discussion of the ADA's most litigated
provisions and the disparity in interpretations of these key provisions.
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
scope of the ADA's potential plaintiff class. Just as the insur-
ance industry, medical professionals, health care facilities, and
medical institutions struggle to learn how to adapt to meet the
changing needs of these specialized patients, legislators and
government officials will be forced to accommodate the complex
needs of these disabled individuals, if they are to follow the
direction provided them by the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and
subsequent legislation.
Litigation and common law will most likely enlarge the class
of the potential plaintiffs to comply with the underlying policy
goal of the protection of opportunities for disabled persons. The
federal judiciary, with the exception of the Fourth Circuit,' 9
stands poised to continue to apply the ADA's protective provi-
sions to asymptomatic HIV patients.'8 ° Aside from the Fourth
Circuit anomaly, many federal courts' 8 ' regard HIV disease as
a disability under the ADA or as a handicap under the Rehabil-
itation Act.'82 However, even the Fourth Circuit has not fore-
closed the potential for asymptomatic patients to join the plain-
tiff class. The circuit's
disagreement is rooted in its opinion that under the ADA,
there are no per se disabilities . . . [and that] each individ-
ual condition must undergo an independent, case-by-case
analysis of whether the condition is physically impairing
and whether the impairment substantially limits one or
more of the individual's major life activities."
Although the class may not be firmly established and the requi-
site criteria for membership not so clearly defined, the potential
to join the plaintiff pool is still a viable option for patients like
Sidney Abbott.
179. See Runnebaum v. NationsBank, 123 F.3d 156 (4th Cir. 1998). In this action
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the
ground that the appellant-employee's asymptomatic human immunodeficiency virus
(HIV) infection was not a disability contemplated by the ADA. See id. at 161.
180. See Carlis & McCabe, supra note 31, at 588-89.
181. See, e.g., United States v. Morvant, 898 F. Supp. 1157, 1161-62 (E.D. La.
1995); Howe v. Hull, 873 F. Supp 72, 78 (N.D. Ohio 1994).




If we want to keep these specialized patients healthy, work-
ing, providing for their families, and contributing to our econo-
mies and societies for as long as humanly possible, we need to
be willing to make some sort of legal provisions in the interim
to help them meet these goals at their own levels of competen-
cy and feasibility. By recognizing that a greater portion of our
society may now fit the definition of "disabled," we are making
the requisite concessions to level the playing field so that citi-
zens can have the same access to health, employment, recre-
ation, and other forms of activities and services. The balancing
of a person's access to these "major life activities" against the
clinical and perceptual risks of treating infectious patients will
certainly involve the cooperation of our legislators, medical
providers, health care professionals, and the greater public.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ADA is not an easy statute to interpret, let alone to
apply to complex practical situations. Sidney Abbott sought
routine dental treatment in the form of a noninvasive procedure
and received what she considered to be the discriminatory "run-
around" in addition to a pretextual excuse for denying her den-
tal treatment. Abbott disagreed with Dr. Bragdon that the par-
ticular risk assessment concerning the contagiousness and dan-
gerous nature of her asymptomatic condition could be fairly and
accurately determined from his spontaneous, biased, and en-
tangled perspective. Rather, from her perspective as a patient,
Abbott perceived a referral to either another facility or provider
for a simple cavity-filling procedure as flatly unacceptable. Con-
sequently, Abbott litigated to push for an objective determina-
tion of the threat of contagion," so that she and other pa-
tients like her could continue to live their lives in as normal
and undisturbed a manner as possible, given their terminal
conditions with AIDS.
184. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2210 (1998) ("The existence . . . of a
significant risk must be determined from the standpoint of the person who refuses
the treatment or accommodation, and the risk assessment must be based on medical
or other objective evidence.").
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Abbott fought to define a potential plaintiff class of HIV-posi-
tive patients deserving full statutory protection under the broad
guarantees of the ADA. Abbott battled the discrimination and
stigma of individuals like Bragdon, and struggled to assign
legal liability to those ignoring the protections due her under
the long arms of applicable federal statutes. Because of her
efforts, our legislators and judges will probably mirror the com-
mitments of medical researchers and patient advocates, who
press daily for a fast-paced approach to treating, and ultimate-
ly, curing, this overwhelming health pandemic.
Lisa Taylor Hudson
